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Parts and Service Included:
An Information-Centered Approach to Kodak
and the Problem of Aftermarket Monopolies
Salil Kumart
Durable goods ranging from farm machinery to computer
hardware invariably require service, supplies, or replacement
parts after their initial sale. The influence of original equipment
makers ("OEMs") in the secondary market (or "aftermarket") for
such complementary goods has attracted recent legal attention.
In the classical economic world of perfect, costless information,
OEMs could not wield monopoly power' in these aftermarkets,
because consumers would factor the necessary complements of a
product into its price. As a result, an OEM that charged higher
prices in the aftermarket would soon lose sales in the market for
original equipment. Accordingly, until the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Image Technical Service, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co.,2 the
circuit courts had adopted as law the economic argument that an
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Antitrust law has traditionally focused on the problem of monopolies. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice§ 1.3 at 19
(West, 1994). Economic theory predicts that monopoly firms can charge consumers higher
prices than firms in competitive markets. Id § 1.2 at 12. The Supreme Court has defined
this "monopoly power" or, as it is referred to more generally, "market power," as "[tihe
power [of a seller] to set higher than competitive prices." Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 590 (1986). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v Image
Technical Services, Inc., 112 S Ct 2072, 2080 (1992), quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 14 (1984) ("Market power is the power 'to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.'").
2 903 F2d 612 (9th Cir 1990), aff'd 112 S Ct 2072 (1992).
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OEM that sold in a competitive primary market could not be a
monopolist in its product's aftermarket.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v
Image Technical Services, Inc.4 called previous use of economic
theory into question.' The Court noted that in the real world,
information is costly and difficult to obtain, so consumers might
not know the life-cycle cost of operating and maintaining durable
equipment.' Accordingly, the Court posited that OEMs could
charge consumers monopolistic prices in aftermarkets for services
and parts without affecting competitive primary markets.7 Simply put, if consumers purchased the original equipment without
good information on aftermarket costs, and if switching to other
products were expensive, then OEMs could charge excessive
prices for aftermarket goods.'
Although the Kodak Court expressed a well-founded concern
about the effects of information costs on the "commercial realities" faced by consumers,9 the Court left little guidance as to how
to interpret such market imperfections, leaving courts and private parties confused as to what conduct is illegal. Moreover, the
Kodak decision called for a more fact-intensive trial inquiry,
which might impede summary judgment ° and contradict the
' See Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2100 (Scalia dissenting), citing Virtual Maintenance,Inc. v
Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F2d 1318, 1328 (6th Cir 1992), vacated for further consideration, 113 S Ct 314 (1992); Grappone, Inc. v Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F2d 792,
798 (1st Cir 1988); Al. Root Co. v Computer/Dynamics,Inc., 806 F2d 673, 675-77 & n 3
(6th Cir 1986); General Business Systems v North American Philips Corp, 699 F2d 965,
977 (9th Cir 1983). See also Kodak, 903 F2d at 621-23 (9th Cir 1990) (Wallace dissenting)
(questioning majority's attempt to distinguish Kodak from GeneralBusiness Systems).
4 112 S Ct 2072 (1992).
' See Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power through Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 Md L Rev 336, 358-60 (1993) ("[A]long with FTC v. Ticor Insurance Co. [a 1992 case reexamining the state-action immunity defense], Kodak apparently
reverses the general direction of antitrust jurisprudence set by the Court over the past
fifteen years. During that time .... the Court consistently contracted the scope of judicial
involvement in antitrust enforcement, often relying on economic theory to resolve disputed issues at the summary judgment stage.").
6 Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2086.
Id at 2086-88.
8 Id.
9 Id.
'0 See Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 Minn L Rev 1, 24
(1994); William W. Schwarzer and Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman
Kodak, 45 Hastings L J 1, 8-10 (1993) (recognizing that Kodak might effectively raise the
standard for summary judgment in antitrust cases). Making summary judgment more
difficult to obtain is especially troublesome because antitrust cases can consume tremendous resources. See, for example, Allen-Myland, Inc. v IBM Corp, 33 F3d 194, 198 n 2 (3d
Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 684 (1994) ("[F]inding facts or reviewing those findings for
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Court's emphasis on administrative efficiency in antitrust law."
In response to these difficulties, this Comment advocates a
rule that exempts OEMs from antitrust liability in aftermarkets
when, at the time of purchase, OEMs offer consumers fairly
priced contracts to supply aftermarket goods for the reasonable
lifetime of the durable equipment. This rule borrows from the
logic behind warranties:' 2 commentators on consumer product
warranties argue that consumers can and will use information
contained in the price and terms of a warranty to assess product
risks that they will face after purchase." Much like product
warranties, the prices and terms of aftermarket supply contracts
would enable consumers to estimate the life-cycle costs of original
equipment. A rule exempting from antitrust liability those OEMs
that offer such contracts would conserve social resources by providing businesses with clearer guidance and by simplifying the
questions for courts dealing with aftermarket monopolies. Thus,
this rule not only accords with Kodak's text but also maintains
proper concern for the effects of information costs. 4
clear error is no easy task. The thirty-volume record on appeal contains 17,469 pages of
court filings, trial and deposition transcripts, and exhibits. The district court, of course,
was in an even more difficult position. Over 3.5 million pages of discovery documents were
produced and 65 days of deposition testimony were taken.").
"
See Jacobs, 79 Minn L Rev at 24. The Court has emphasized summary judgment
as a device to achieve such efficiency. See, for example, FTC v Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 US 411, 430 (1990) ("The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling.").
The primary economic argument that warranties are efficient is based on this
transfer of information. See Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and
ProductsLiability, 88 Colum L Rev 1057, 1063 (1988) ("[E]mbedded in the product's total
price [including the warranty] are the manufacturer's best estimates of the probabilities of
various product defects and the magnitude of the losses involved."). Note that a warranty
is a type of contract. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty,
90 Yale L J 1297, 1297 (1981).
" See, for example, George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488, 499 (1970); A. Michael Spence, Market
Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes 88-90
(Harvard, 1974). See also W. Keith Bryant and Jennifer L. Gerner, The Priceof a Warranty: The Case for Refrigerators, 12 J Consumer Aff 30, 32 (Summer 1978); Jennifer L.
Gerner and W. Keith Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal? 15 J Consumer
Aff 75, 77-86 (Summer 1981) (empirical work confirming some of the theorists' predictions); Priest, 90 Yale L J at 1303, 1306 (noting that the objective of the 1974 MagnusonMoss Warranty Act was to make warranties more efficient signals of quality to aid consumer choice).
"4 See Gordon B. Spivack and Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: EnlightenedAntitrust Analysis
and Traditional Tying Law, 62 Antitrust L J 203, 206 (1993) (commending the Court's
balanced decision to bring market imperfections such as information and switching costs
into antitrust analysis without "a wholesale rejection of economic theory"); Comment,
Rewriting the Law of Resale PriceMaintenance:The Kodak Decisionand TransactionCost
Economics, 143 U Pa L Rev 321, 360 (1994) (suggesting that Kodak's emphasis on market
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KODAK AND ITS CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS

Kodak must be considered against the backdrop of antitrust
law, which has historically focused on prohibiting monopolies.'

Economic theory predicts that a monopolist will injure consumers
by reducing supply, thereby raising prices. 6 In a competitive
market, if one firm raises its prices above the market price, other
firms will undercut the firm and lure away consumers.' 7 But a
monopolist, by definition, is the only firm in the market and so
may, without fear of 18competition, raise prices to whatever level
maximizes its profits.
Courts have applied the Sherman Act'9 by searching out
harms to consumers associated with monopolies. Consequently,
antitrust law has developed a body of concepts (and a vocabulary)
to assess such harms. The Supreme Court has defined "market
power," a prerequisite for most antitrust injuries, as "[t]he power
[of a seller] to set higher than competitive prices."" As a result,
to win antitrust claims, plaintiffs must prove that a defendant
firm possesses "market power."2 ' As a proxy for "market power,"
courts have used the more measurable "market share"--the percentage of sales in a relevant market made by the firm in question. The higher the market share, it is assumed, the more likely
that market power exists. 2 Of course, to determine market

imperfections will benefit antitrust analysis of resale price maintenance practices).
" A monopoly is defined as a market with one seller. Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust
Policy § 1.2 at 12 (cited in note 1). Section 2 of the Sherman Act calls for fines and/or imprisonment for every single person who monopolizes, or attempts to monopolize, interstate
commerce. 15 USC § 2 (1988 & Supp 1990).
16 Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 1.2 at 12 (cited in note 1). It has been argued that some monopolies benefit consumers by increasing overall efficiency and reducing costs. See Richard A- Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust: Cases, Economic
Notes and Other Materials 394-95 (West, 2d ed 1981).
"
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 1.1 at 8 (cited in note 1).
18 Some economists also emphasize the importance of "barriers to entry." If competitors can quickly and cheaply enter the monopolized market, then the monopolist will hesitate to raise its prices above the competitive level. See, for example, R.E. Caves and M.E.
Porter, Market Structure, Oligopoly, and Stability of Market Shares, 26 J Industrial Econ
289 (1978). See also Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry
Barriers, 10 Bell J Econ 20 (1979) (suggesting a general theoretical approach for analyzing the decisions of potential entrants facing barriers). For a general discussion of entry
barriers, see Posner and Easterbrook, Antitrust at 513.
" 15 USC §§ 1 et seq (1988 & Supp 1990).
20 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 590 (1986).
See also note 1 and accompanying text.
21 Matsushita,475 US at 590. See also Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2080-81.
2
See Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2081; Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo. 2 v Hyde, 466
US 2, 17 (1984).
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share, courts must engage in "market definition": they must decide what products and firms make up the "relevant market."'
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision, several circuits
had accepted that, as a matter of law, an OEM that competed in
a competitive primary market could not be a monopolist in its
product's aftermarket, even if it sold 100% of its product's aftermarket needs.' The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected this theory
in the Kodak case, positing that "market imperfections can keep
economic theories about how consumers will act from mirroring
reality."' Affirming this ruling, the Supreme Court opened up
product aftermarkets to antitrust scrutiny, even when the original product market is competitive.2"
A. Kodak
The Kodak opinion makes it easier for plaintiffs in an antitrust suit to oppose summary judgment motions that are grounded primarily in economic theory rather than fact27 and calls for
courts to conduct evaluations of market imperfections made possible by information costs.' In Kodak, defendant Eastman Kodak faced a competitive market in the primary market for photocopiers:" enough companies manufactured copiers that no one
company could charge
supracompetitive prices and still maintain
its market share.3" Relying on existing case law, Kodak argued

' See Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and FederalAntitrust Law § 3.2 at 59 (West,
1985) ("The inference is strong that a firm with a high share of a relevant market has
market power. Markets do not define themselves, however.").
24 See, for example, Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F2d 1318,
1328 (6th Cir), vacated for further consideration, 113 S Ct 314 (1992); Grappone, Inc. v
Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F2d 792, 798 (1st Cir 1988).
2
Kodak, 903 F2d at 617.
2 Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2087-88.
See Jacobs, 79 Minn L Rev at 26 (cited in note 10) (suggesting that Kodak makes it
easier for plaintiffs to oppose summary judgment motions based primarily on economic
theory). But see Schwarzer and Hirsch, 45 Hastings L J at 10 (cited in note 10) (arguing
that because the Court in Kodak did not discuss certain previous summary judgment cases, lower courts should read Kodak not as raising new barriers to summary judgment, but
as clarifying specific points in antitrust law). Note that Judge Schwarzer issued the
district court decision in Kodak, which the Ninth Circuit overturned. Image Technical
Services, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cases (CCH) T 68,402 (N D Cal 1988),
rev'd, 903 F2d 621 (9th Cir 1990), aff'd, 112 S Ct 2072 (1992).
' See Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 365 (cited in note 5) ("[Llower courts considering the
rationale of Kodak, and not just its vocabulary, will likely feel bound, logically and equitably, to extend its application to almost every market and information gap.").
29 Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2081 n 10.
' See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.3 at 93 (cited in note 1) (noting that
Kodak had a 20-23 percent market share in photocopiers, which is below what courts

1526

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:1521

that it could not charge monopolistic prices in the aftermarket for
parts and supplies, since consumers would factor the higher aftermarket prices over the life of the photocopier into their purchasing decision."' The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and denied Kodak summary judgment. The Court concluded that
"[Lhe fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint on
prices in the aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence of
[market] power in those [after]markets."32 The Court noted that
lack of information could prevent consumers from factoring the
higher aftermarket prices into their original purchasing decisions.3 3 Purchasers who did not anticipate high-priced service
and parts would have to pay such prices because their investment would prevent easy switching-giving Kodak market power.3
In response Kodak argued that market imperfections, though
possible, did not in fact injure consumers in the market for photocopiers. According to Kodak, many of its customers were "sophisticated purchasers" who could undertake comparative studies
and demand competitive life-cycle prices.3 5 Sophisticated consumers, Kodak argued, would not buy original equipment at
supracompetitive prices. 6 Further, Kodak argued that the behavior of sophisticated consumers would bring unduly high aftermarket costs to the attention of unsophisticated consumers.
Although the Court accepted the idea that well-informed
consumers did not need antitrust protection from informationdriven market imperfections, the Court concluded that Kodak
might be able to overcharge "unsophisticated" consumers,38
thereby still reaping monopoly profits.3 9 Alternatively, the Court
usually require "to support market power claims of any sort, including tying claims"). See
also id, citing, for example, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2
(1984) (a tying case where 30 percent was ruled insufficient).
3' 112 S Ct at 2081-82.
Id at 2084.
Id at 2086-87.
Id at 2087.
Id.
Id.
37 Id.
' Note that antitrust law makes this distinction in other areas, including the determination of which mergers to bar as anticompetitive. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy § 12.5 at 479 (cited in note 1) ("Courts have often cited the presence of powerful or
sophisticated buyers or suppliers as militating against the likelihood of any exercise of
market power by a merging firm."). See also FTC v Elders Grain,Inc., 868 F2d 901, 905
(7th Cir 1989) ("A concentrated and knowledgeable buying side makes collusion by sellers
more difficult.").
9 112 S Ct at 2086-87. Price discrimination occurs when a firm makes sales at more
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suggested that Kodak might forgo sophisticated buyers to soak
the unsophisticated.4"
In effect, the Supreme Court's ruling opened up a new line of
argument in the litigation of OEM aftermarket monopolies. 4 '
The Court pointed out that an OEM in a competitive primary
market could still possess market power in the aftermarket, so
long as certain information-driven market imperfections were
prominent enough.42 Unfortunately, the Court gave little guidance to lower courts on how to apply its discussion of market
imperfections.
B. Lower Courts
Lower courts have adopted at least two approaches since
Kodak. Some courts have emphasized that when a defendant
offers "factual data," and not just pure economic theory concerning the relationship between the primary and secondary markets,
Kodak is "inapposite" and summary judgment may be granted.'
Other courts have held that Kodak forces them to reconsider the
question of market power in aftermarkets by conducting a factual
inquiry into the "commercial realities," including market imperfections, faced by consumers." The Kodak opinion lends itself to

than one rate of return. Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 14.1 at 516 (cited in note
1). If the favored purchaser is paying a competitive price, then the disfavored purchasers
must be paying a price higher than the competitive price. "For this reason, the ability to
price discriminate is evidence that the seller has a certain amount of market power." Id §
14.1 at 517.
"' 112 S Ct at 2086. Note that the Court here seems to have in mind a "separating
equilibrium." See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randall C. Picker, Game
Theory and the Law 140-47 (Harvard, 1994). Given certain conditions, one party can ask a
question or make an offer to another party that will force the second party to reveal
information about themselves that otherwise might remain private, nonverifiable information. Id at 147. In the Kodak context, the Court posited that if there were two types of
consumers, sophisticated and unsophisticated, Eastman Kodak might deliberately price
its products so that sophisticated consumers would not consider them, in order to deal
only with unsophisticated consumers.
"' The Ninth Circuit's Kodak opinion was the first by a court of appeals to reject arguments such as Kodak's because of the possibility of market imperfections. See Kodak,
112 S Ct 2072, 2100 (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted). Of course, if aftermarkets
could be defined as "relevant markets," 100 percent market share, such as that possessed
by Kodak in its aftermarket, would aid plaintiffs in establishing antitrust liability.
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.1 at 81-82 (cited in note 1).
42 Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2086-88.
See Mr. Sprout,Inc. v United States, 8 F3d 118, 125 (2d Cir 1993), cert denied, 114
S Ct 2674 (1994).
See, for example, Allen-Myland, Inc. v IBM Corp, 33 F3d 194 (3d Cir), cert denied,
115 S Ct 684 (1994) (stating that Kodak may require consideration of market imperfections).
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both interpretations, and they are not entirely inconsistent. But
both views are problematic: one approach fails to address how a
court should classify economic arguments as permissible factbased arguments or as impermissible theory. The other approach
advocates an open-ended inquiry that may be difficult for courts
to undertake and may prove puzzling to businesses trying to
organize their affairs.
1. Mr. Sprout: the problem of separating "factual data" from
"economic theory."
In Mr. Sprout, Inc. v United States,' the Second Circuit
interpreted Kodak to say that "summary judgment on the sole
basis of economic theory" rather than "factual data" is inappropriate, but that Kodak is inapplicable when defendants supply
factual data.4" As a result, in the Second Circuit a defendant
need only supply factual data to defend against a "tying"

claim.

47

In Mr. Sprout, the plaintiff alleged that intervenor Conrail
was illegally imposing surcharges on certain routes to discourage
the plaintiff from filing damage claims.' Conrail claimed it
needed the surcharge to defend against the particular plaintiffwholesalers' frequent damage claims. 49 In order to subject Conrail to statutory "reregulation," plaintiff sought to demonstrate,
as a threshold matter, that Conrail had market power over the
shippers." In response Conrail supplied statistics indicating

8 F3d 118 (2d Cir 1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 2674 (1994).
8 F3d at 125.
" A "tie-in" or "tying" arrangement is a sale or lease of one product (the "ying"
product) on the condition that the buyer take a second product (the "tied" product) as well.
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 10.1 at 351 (cited in note 1). Tying arrangements
can violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1 (1988 & Supp 1990); § 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 USC § 14 (1988); and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USCA § 45
(1988 & Supp 1995). See generally Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy §§ 10.1, 10.3 at
351 & n 1, 361-62. In order to find an illegal tying arrangement, courts must find
"sufficient [market] power" in the tying product's market to restrain competition in the
market being tied. Id § 10.1 at 351 n 3, citing Digidyne v Data General Corp, 734 F2d
1336, 1338 (9th Cir 1984) (enunciating "perhaps the most frequently cited test"). Two
other requirements of this test are that: (1) "the scheme in question involves two distinct
items and provides that one (the tying product) may not be obtained unless the other (the
tied product) is also purchased"; and (2) "a 'not insubstantial' amount of commerce is affected by the arrangement." Id.
4

4

8 F3d at 122.

'9 Id at 121.
' Id at 123. According to the plaintiff, Conrail illegally charged competing distributors higher transport rates, in order to take over the potato wholesale business itself. Id
at 124.
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that the ratio of its revenues to its costs was similar to that of
other railroads in competitive markets.5 ' Because economic theory predicts that firms in competitive markets price their goods
differently than monopoly firms,52 the court held the evidence
that Conrail priced its goods in a manner similar to firms in
competitive markets sufficient to show that it operated in a competitive market, and thus did not possess the market power required to find an antitrust violation. 3 The court limited Kodak
to cases in which defendants do not offer factual data, deciding
that no inquiry into the market imperfections discussed in Kodak
was necessary.5 4
Presumably, had the court decided that Conrail's argument
was based "solely on economic theory,"55 then Kodak would have
applied. But Kodak cannot mean that a defendant's offer of any
factual data makes Kodak irrelevant. Like Conrail, Kodak offered
factual evidence that it participated in a competitive primary
market. 56 But in Kodak, the Supreme Court rejected Kodak's
argument that economic theory alone could prove that a competitive primary market indicated a competitive aftermarket.5 7
In contrast, by ruling that actual cost-revenue ratios could
demonstrate that Conrail did not possess market power, the
court in Mr. Sprout used economic theory to establish the link
between the market in question and other competitive markets.
Both Kodak's argument about the links between primary markets and aftermarkets and Conrail's argument reveal how courts
dealing with market power rely to some extent on economic theory." Thus, Mr. Sprout requires courts to separate fact from the5' Id.
52

Theory suggests that firms produce the quantity at which the marginal cost of

producing an additional unit equals the marginal revenue gained by selling that unit in
the market. In a competitive market, that marginal revenue equals the price of the good,
which does not change due to a single firm's behavior, since competitors will continue to
sell at that price. By contrast, monopolists, who have no competitors, can alter the price of
the good in the market in relation to the quantity that they produce. Thus monopolists
can maximize their profits by reducing the quantity they produce and raising prices. See
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy §§ 1.1-1.2 at 8-14 (cited in note 1).
Mr. Sprout, 8 F3d at 124-25.
Id at 125.
Id.
Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2081 n 10.
L7 Id at 2084.
Kodak's argument depends on the theory that perfectly informed consumers
understand, calculate, and purchase based on the relationships between primary markets
and aftermarkets. See also Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v Sterling Electric, Inc., 866
F2d 228, 236 (7th Cir 1988) (Posner dissenting) (arguing that a lack of market power in
the primary market necessarily forecloses the possibility of abusing market power in the
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ory and to decide which theories are permissible. However, the
court supplied no method for drawing these distinctions.
Of course, defendants can still use economic theory as well
as factual data to obtain summary judgment. But Mr. Sprout
requires courts to distinguish factual data from economic theory
to decide whether Kodak applies.59 Then, as the comparison between Kodak's argument and the defendant's argument in Mr.
Sprout suggests, courts must decide which economic theories
defendants may use to obtain summary judgment, and which
they cannot." Finally, courts must weigh the theory advanced,
if the theory is ruled permissible, against contrary facts."' This
balancing will be difficult for courts, summary judgment will
become harder to obtain, and judicial efficiency will suffer.62
In view of these wide implications, the court in Mr. Sprout
effectively decided that Kodak did not apply to the specific economic theory used by the defendant in Mr. Sprout: cost-revenue
ratios. But for other economic theories, future courts will again
have to separate economic theory from factual data, decide on the
permissibility of the theory, and then possibly weigh theory versus facts.63 Mr. Sprout and Kodak have left lower courts with no
guidance on how to perform these tasks.' As a result lower

aftermarket). The defendant's argument in Mr. Sprout depends on the theories that: (1)
the relationship between price, marginal cost, and marginal revenue for a firm in a
competitive market is different than that for a monopoly; and (2) to the extent that the
ratio between two firms' costs and revenues are similar, they must both be either firms in
competitive markets or monopolies. See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy §§ 1.1-1.2 at
8-14 (cited in note 1).
' See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 16.8 at 581 (cited in note 1) (suggesting
that, after Kodak, courts will have to weigh economic theory versus contrary fact in order
to decide summary judgment motions). Weighing fact against theory necessarily requires
separating the two.

' See id § 16.8 at 580-81. Hovenkamp notes that after Kodak, courts considering
summary judgment motions will effectively have to ask two questions: (1) "[W]hen is an

economic theory so robust that claims contrary to it must be regarded as in some sense
'implausible?- and (2) "When the economic theory is robust, what extra factual showing is
necessary before plaintiffs can proceed with a claim inconsistent with the theory?" Id §
16.8 at 580. According to Hovenkamp, neither Matsushita (an important, pre-Kodak

antitrust summary judgment case) nor Kodak is very helpful in deciding which economic
theories may be used to obtain summary judgment. Id § 16.8 at 581.

Mr. Sprout, 8 F3d at 118.
See Schwarzer and Hirsch, 45 Hastings L J at 10-12 (cited in note 10) (expressing
fear that Kodak will lead lower courts to require parties moving for summary judgment to
supply factual evidence disproving the opponent's case; courts would thus become more
wary of movants' arguments, resulting in a decline in the use of summary judgment).
61

'

Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 16.8 at 580-81 (cited in note 1).

See id § 16.8 at 581.
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courts may adopt unpredictable and incompatible approaches,

effectively raising the standard for summary judgment.65
2. Allen-Myland: the difficulties of an open-ended inquiry
into information-driven market imperfections.
Some courts have decided that Kodak forces them to conduct
a factual inquiry into the "commercial realities" faced by consumers in order to define market power.66 In one case, AllenMyland, Inc. v IBM Corp,"7 the Third Circuit read the Kodak
decision as denying summary judgment based on the existence of
market imperfections such as high information and switching
costs.6 8 Thus the Third Circuit investigated whether the case
involved "locked-in" consumers and whether this created market
power.6 9 Defendant IBM supplied evidence of competing computers at trial, but unlike in Mr. Sprout, the court held defendant's
use of factual data insufficient to escape Kodak."° In AllenMyland, the court used Kodak to direct the method by which
such data should be evaluated. This inquiry into "commercial
realities" may be problematic. Under this rubric, judges and
juries must consider fairly complex anecdotal evidence."' This
discretionary approach may provide little notice for businesses
and administrative headaches for future courts. 2
Schwarzer and Hirsch, 45 Hastings L J at 10-12 (cited in note 10).
See, for example, Sunshine Cellular v Vanguard CellularSystems, Inc., 810 F Supp
486, 494 (S D NY 1992).
33 F3d 194 (3d Cir), cert denied, 115 S Ct 684 (1994).
See id at 205. Switching costs are expenses that consumers incur when moving
from one brand or product to another. See Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of
an Installed Base, 62 Antitrust L J 1, 11 (1993). To the extent that switching costs are
prohibitively high, consumers are said to be "locked-in." Id at 5. An OEM can exploit consumers (1) only if they do not anticipate the higher-than-competitive prices they will be
charged, and (2) only to the extent they are locked in by switching costs. Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F2d 228, 236 (7th Cir 1988) (Posner dissenting). See also Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2087. Furthermore, OEMs may be penalized by
future consumers if the consumers learn of this type of past behavior. Parts and Electric
Motors, 866 F2d at 236. Thus, at least two commentators have argued that market power
can exist in product aftermarkets "only when information costs are high for consumers
with high switching costs." Michael W. Mass and Richard T. Rapp, Litigatingthe Key Economic Issues Under Kodak, Antitrust 14-16 (Spring 1993).
' Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 205.
70 Id at 205-06.
71 Note that the complexity of one antitrust case led a court to decide that a jury
would not be permitted to hear the case, in effect creating a "complexity exception" to the
Seventh Amendment. See In re JapaneseElectronicProductsAntitrust Litigation, 631 F2d
1069, 1084-86 (3d Cir 1980).
' See Jacobs, 79 Minn L Rev at 28-29 (cited in note 10) (stressing business's need for
clear guidance, not rules with an "ambiguous, qualitative character").
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In Allen-Myland, both plaintiff Allen-Myland, Inc. ("AMI")
and defendant IBM upgraded mainframe computers originally
built by defendant IBM. 73 Although AMI bought its upgrade
parts directly from IBM, AMI prospered by performing upgrades
with less downtime than defendant IBM. In 1980, however, when
IBM introduced its next generation of mainframes, IBM prevented AMI and other independent service providers from obtaining
the parts necessary to perform upgrades on these models.' In
response, AMI filed a complaint alleging, among other things,
that IBM had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"combination[s] [and other means] in restraint of trade."75 AMI
claimed that, by these practices, IBM illegally forced consumers
to purchase their aftermarket services from IBM rather than
from potentially cheaper competitors.76
Consumers would suffer from IBM's practices only to the
extent that IBM possessed market power sufficient to force consumers to use IBM mainframes or go without; as a result, the
Third Circuit panel investigated the degree to which IBM mainframe users, possessing significant applications software and
databases, could move such applications and data to smaller
computers, and were thus not actually "locked in" to IBM mainframes. The Third Circuit panel advised that, to analyze the effects of this lock-in, the district court should determine the percentage of existing mainframe users who were unable to move to
a new system by prohibitively high switching costs.77 The court
stated that the higher the percentage of locked-in consumers, the
more likely that IBM could charge monopoly prices in the largescale mainframe market, and the less likely that IBM would be
constrained by the existence of other types of computers.78 In
accordance with this reasoning, "It~he [district] court may, after
considering the evidence and the nature of the market, exercise
its discretion and reduce IBM's market share by a number great-

7' Alkn-Myland, 33 F3d at 198-99. The mainframe computers in question were
physically large machines that required tailoring to the needs of specific users. Id.
7' The new mainframes were sold under a pricing system that bundled IBM installation labor together with replacement parts necessary for future upgrades. Id. Additionally,
IBM eliminated most parts sales to independent service providers, making a few sales at
prohibitively high prices. Id. Furthermore, under the terms of a mainframe sale, after an
upgrade, any used parts recovered were IBM's property. Id. Consequently, neither new
nor used parts were available to independent service providers.
See id; 15 USC § 1.
7' Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 199.
77 Id at 206 n 15.
78 Id.
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er than zero percent but less than the full extent [100 percent] of
the market for other types of computers."79
In effect, the Third Circuit read Kodak to promote an inquiry
into the possibility of switching costs,8" and attempted to provide the district court instruction on how to analyze locked-in
consumers to determine market power."' The Court of Appeals
indicated that the effects of switching costs should be considered
in market definition-with courts adopting a narrower or broader
"' Id. For an example of how this rule would work, suppose that IBM had an 80
percent share of the market for mainframes, and that the market for mainframes was
equally large as the market for other computers. Depending on its impression of the ease
of switching from mainframes to other computers, the district court could adjust IBM's
market share to 40 percent (finding it quite easy or cheap to switch), 80 percent (impossible to switch), or something in between. The math would run as follows: suppose X
represents total industry sales in the mainframe market, and Y represents total industry
sales in the market of small computers. The district court should determine a number Z
from 0 to 100 percent representing how much of the market of small computers should be
included in defining IBM's market. The easier to switch, the higher Z would be. If BM
has an 80 percent market share in the mainframe market, then for Z = 0 (impossible to
switch), IBM's market share is:
(its total share of the mainframe market) ( (the total size of the mainframe market) + ( (the total size of the small computer
market) * (a figure Z representing the degree of interchangeability of small computers and mainframes) ) ) =
(80% * X) (C) + (Y * Z) ) =
(80% * X) - ( () + (Y * 0) =
80% * X + X = 80%.
For Z = 100% (complete interchangeability),
(80% * X) - ( (X) + (Y * Z) ) =
(80% * X) + (() + (Y * 100%)).
If X = Y (the two markets are equally large), then IBM's market share is:
(80%* X) ((X) + (X)) =
0.8X + (2X) =
0.4 = 40%.
Note that for Z between 0 and 100, IBM's market share would be adjusted to between 80
percent and 40 percent. This calculation would be more complex if the two markets were
not of the same size.
Finally, note that small changes in how the court estimates Z can have substantial
effects on the final calculation of market share, especially if Y (here, the size of the market for small computers) is much greater than X (here, the size of the market for main-

frames).
' See note 68, discussing the relationship between costly information and switching
costs.
8' Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 205-06. Note that, because Kodak was decided in the
interim, the parties in Alen-Myland first raised the lock-in issue on appeal. Id at 205.
The Court of Appeals left the question of whether to consider new issues, including the
lock-in question, to the district court on remand. Id at 206.
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market, 2 depending on the extent of locked-in consumers. 3 If
a court determined that a high percentage of consumers were
locked in, then the court would define the relevant market more
narrowly, and thus make it more likely that the court would find
a violation of the antitrust laws.'
Allen-Myland directs district court judges to pick a number
from zero to one hundred based on their impression of expert
testimony, anecdotal evidence, and estimates of the number of
consumers who were capable of switching products. 5 Such ambiguous directions pose a danger of arbitrariness. There is no
guarantee that judges will easily and accurately estimate
interchangeability based on this type of evidence. 6 Furthermore, businesses might lack guidance since they would face similar difficulties in assessing what courts would conclude from the
available evidence. 7 Judges and private actors will also have to
expend resources trying to make sense of impressionistic, factspecific precedents to guide their future decisions.
Although Allen-Myland, like Kodak, concerned "complex
durable goods,""s at least one case has extended the concern
over the market imperfections discussed in Kodak to services. 9
' A broader market definition would have aided IBM because market power is
traditionally estimated by market share (a proxy variable). Generally the higher a firm's
market share in a relevant market, the more likely it is to possess market power. See
Jefferson ParishHospital District No. 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 17 (1984). Since IBM sold a
fixed number of mainframes, the more the court widened the definition of the relevant
market, the lower IBM's market share (IBM's sales + total relevant market sales) would
have been. A lower market share implies that the firm is less likely to possess market
power.
ss Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 205-06 & n 15.
See id at 205-06.
Id at 206 n 15.
See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 3.5 at 105 (cited in note 1) (Judges
"often ignore elasticity of supply or else have difficulty in stating the relevant concerns"
when they measure market power in light of interchangeability of products.). In particular, Hovenkamp points to Fineman v Armstrong World Industries,Inc., 980 F2d 171, 20001 (3d Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1285 (1993), which concluded that "video tape
'magazines' of floor coverings were a relevant market because linoleum sellers wishing to
purchase such videos would not find other kinds of videos a substitute." Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.5 at 105 n 11. Hovenkamp criticizes Fineman as "totally ignoring
the fact that someone with the equipment to videotape floor coverings could probably
videotape refrigerators, sofas or farm animals, or vice-versa, with little additional investment." Id.
' See Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 371-72 (cited in note 5) (noting the difficulties that
smaller firms will have in predicting what courts will make of market imperfections such
as switching costs after Kodak).
s Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 198; Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2077.
See Lee v Life Insurance Company ofNorth America, 829 F Supp 529, 536-39 (D RI
1993) (Student plaintiffs argued that the University of Rhode Island violated antitrust
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If judges and OEMs have found it difficult to interpret or assign
numerical ratings to the interchangeability of durable goods,
services will prove even more difficult to compare." Thus, AllenMyland's discretionary inquiry into market imperfections has serious defects. This interpretation of Kodak gives businesses little
guidance9 ' and would be costly for courts to administer.
II. INFORMATION AS THE KEY TO THE AFTERMARKET MONOPOLY
PROBLEM

The problem of information costs holds the key to both Kodak and the overall problem of aftermarket monopolies. Information gaps drove the Court's opinion in Kodak. Whether due to the
cost or unavailability of information, the Court reasoned that
some consumers will remain unable to estimate accurately the
life-cycle costs of durable equipment.92 These information gaps
can lead to aftermarket monopoly power for OEMs.
Two examples illustrate how information costs can make
aftermarket monopolies possible.93 First, consider a consumer
who must buy both original equipment and aftermarket products.
Under the assumptions of classical economics, the consumer
possesses perfect, that is costless, complete information about
price and other attributes of all goods in the market. 4 Thus,
laws by forcing them to buy health insurance together with their college educations; the
court interpreted Kodak to authorize an inquiry into information and switching costs that
might hamper students from purchasing outside insurance or attending other colleges.).
' Courts have trouble with the concept of "elasticity of supply"-the ability of the
market to supply more of a product available given a rise in price. Hovenkamp, Federal
Antitrust Policy § 3.5 at 105 (cited in note 1). To estimate elasticity of supply for durable
goods, judges look at how much existing plants can produce, as well as the speed and
expense of existing plant expansion or new plant production. See Posner and Easterbrook,
Antitrust at 512 (cited in note 16), discussing FTC v Procter & Gamble Co., 386 US 568
(1967). Courts must also decide to what extent different products' supplies are interchangeable and thus augment supply. See, for example, FTC v Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F
Supp 27 (D DC), vacated, 850 F2d 694 (DC Cir 1988) (deciding that glass and plastic jars
composed a single market because assembly lines for their production were interchangeable).
"1 See Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 373 (cited in note 5).
112 S Ct at 2086.
' For simplicity, both examples are grounded in the assumptions of perfect competition. However, the first model has perfect information about price, quality, and sources
of supply, while the second does not. Perfect information is one of the three conditions of a
perfectly competitive market in classical economics. The other two conditions are that (1)
buyers and sellers must be numerous, and consequently price takers in the sense that
their individual transactions do not affect the market price, and (2) the product sold by
the firms in the industry must be homogeneous. Edwin Mansfield, Principles of
Microeconomics 219-20 (Norton, 3d ed 1980).
'4 Id.
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consumers can estimate the costs of original equipment and aftermarket needs together as if they were a single product. If the
OEM tries to sell this aggregate product at higher than the equilibrium price in the market, the informed consumer will purchase
elsewhere. 5 As a result, Kodak-style aftermarket monopolies
cannot exist in the classical economic world of perfect competition."
By contrast, without the assumption of perfect information,
the OEM can make the consumer pay prices that are higher than
the market price in a world of perfect competition. For example,
suppose that the consumer is at the OEM's store, and that the
consumer possesses some knowledge about the OEM's products, 7 but nothing, good or bad, about those of the OEM's competitor. Suppose that it costs the consumer time and effort to
learn more about what is available at competitors' stores and
about competitors' products. We can sum up these various costs
in time and effort and call them "information costs."" Because
of these information costs, the OEM could charge a higher-than-

" Suppose the competitive market price for original equipment is P and the competitive market price for aftermarket goods and services is p. Suppose also that the OEM in
question overcharges for original equipment and aftermarket goods and services by
margins M and m respectively above the competitive price. Because this is a perfect
competition model, there are no information costs. Thus, consumers will buy elsewhere
when:
cost of buying from the OEM > cost of buying elsewhere
P+M+p+m>P+p
Subtracting (P + p) from each side,

M + m>0.
Thus, whenever the OEM in question charges any total margin on original equipment and
aftermarket goods greater than zero, consumers will purchase elsewhere. Granted, those
consumers who have already purchased may be stuck with the OEM if the OEM is the
only maker of aftermarket goods for its product. This could result if OEMs possess intellectual property protection for the design of aftermarket products such as replacement
parts. See John J. Voortman, CurbingAftermarket Monopolization, 38 Antitrust Bull 221,
222-23 (1993). But with perfect information, new consumers will factor such an OEM's
overpricing into their assessment of the OEM's original equipment.
' For a more detailed description of which departures from perfect competition must
exist in order for OEMs to benefit from higher aftermarket prices, see Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 311-13 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
" Product-specific knowledge is an important cause of switching costs. See Kattan, 62
Antitrust L J at 11-12 (cited in note 68). Consider the difficulty a Macintosh user often
has making the transition to using DOS. Id.
"s "Information costs" would also include the costs a buyer would incur in estimating
future aftermarket needs and the market prices of those aftermarket needs for different
brands of a product. See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets:
The Consumer ProtectionIssues, 62 BU L Rev 661, 690-91 (1982).
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market price for the combination of the original equipment and
aftermarket goods or services, so long as the margin between the
market price and the price the OEM charges is less than the
amount of the information costs.9 9 In that event, the consumer
will find it less costly to pay supracompetitive prices than to
incur the information costs necessary to avoid such prices.
Though simplistic, these examples illustrate the effect that
information costs can have. As a result of information costs, an
OEM can set prices above the competitive level, and consumers
will pay those prices. The higher the information costs, the greater the ability to price above the market. This is important because the touchstone of any antitrust claim against a monopolistic firm, "market power," has been defined as "[t]he power [of a
seller] to set higher than competitive prices."' °
By this definition, under Kodak, courts could find market
power, and thus a potential antitrust violation, whenever there
are information costs.'' Since many real-world markets suffer
from these defects, Kodak could lead to dramatic increases in
judicial findings of market power.0 2 Some have argued that

' Suppose that the competitive price is P for the original equipment and p for the aftermarket goods and services, and information costs that must be incurred to purchase
elsewhere are i. Suppose the margins by which the OEM in question charges above the
competitive price are M and m respectively for the original equipment and the aftermarket goods and services. The consumer will purchase from the OEM in question when:

cost of buying from the OEM < cost of buying elsewhere
P+M+p+m<P+p+i
Subtracting (P + p) from each side,
M+m<i.

Thus, when the total margin by which the OEM in question overcharges is less than the
information costs that must be incurred to purchase elsewhere, the consumer will buy
from the OEM in question. This method of approaching the problem proceeds from the
idea that one party bases its optimization decision on the assumption that the other party
will also choose the alternative that maximizes its own gain. See generally Baird,
Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 50-57 (cited in note 40) (using a game
theory approach to determine parties' optimal decision trees). The greater the information
costs, the greater the ability to impose supracompetitive pricing. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L Rev
1447, 1447-49 (1993) (In product differentiated markets, firms may possess the ability to
price above the competitive level indefinitely; "the policy question becomes one of degree:
how many and what kinds of deviations should be tolerated.").
100MatsushitaElectricIndustrialCo. v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 590 (1986).
...See also Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself 438-39
(Free Press, 1993) (arguing that "[it is always possible to posit 'market imperfections'
that may result in markets working contrary to the predictions of economics," and that
the "imperfections" in Kodak were "both ingenious and imaginary").
'" See Hovenkamp, 40 UCLA L Rev at 1448 (cited in note 99).
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such far-reaching implications should lead the Court to overturn
Kodak. °3 The Court, however, should not overturn Kodak, because the Court's concern with information costs can have substantial beneficial effects, and represents a recognition of the
important role that information plays in markets.' ° Consistent
with Kodak, a rule that promotes disclosure of information between OEMs and buyers would greatly diminish the ill effects on
consumers of imperfect information." 5 The problem of information costs can be reduced by creating incentives for OEMs and
buyers to share information, thereby creating markets that more
closely resemble the model of perfect information.
HI. OEMs THAT OFFER AFTERMARKET PARTS AND SERVICE
CONTRACTS AT COMPETITIVE PRICES FOR THE REASONABLE
LIFETIME OF DURABLE EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM
KODAK ANTITRUST LIABILITY

A. The Proposal and Its Roots
Courts should fashion a rule exempting OEMs from aftermarket antitrust liability where the OEM offers aftermarket
supply contracts at the time of original equipment purchase. This
rule creates an incentive for OEMs to provide unsophisticated
consumers the information-the life-cycle cost of durable equipment-to make those consumers more "sophisticated."" The
rule is consistent with Kodak in denying antitrust relief to sophisticated consumers-the Court in that case agreed that sophisticated consumers do not need protection from market imperfections. 10 7 Lower courts need only assess whether or not the

"oOne writer has advocated overturning Kodak because, he argues, the market power
it defines is qualitatively different than previous definitions of market power. See Thomas
C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market
Power, 69 NYU L Rev 1, 76 (1994).
10 See Spivack and Ellis, 62 Antitrust L J at 206 (cited in note 14) (welcoming the
Court's balanced decision to make market imperfections such as information costs relevant to antitrust analysis without "a wholesale rejection of economic theory"); Comment,
Rewriting the Law of Resale PriceMaintenance: The Kodak Decision and TransactionCost
Economics, 143 U Pa L Rev 321, 360 (1994) (noting the beneficial effects that "transaction
cost economics"-focusing on market imperfections such as information, bargaining, and
switching costs-as recognized in Kodak can have for resale price maintenance, a branch
of antitrust law).
105 For a discussion on how to choose rules that induce parties to disclose information
efficiently, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 93 (1989).
106

Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2086.

107

Id.
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consumer made a "sophisticated" decision based on the difference
between the price of aftermarket supply contract and the market
price for such a contract.
This Section's logic borrows from previous work in the field
of products liability, showing that warranties effectively convey
information." 8 Where consumers are uninformed as to product
quality, legally enforceable warranties can make a seller's statements about product quality more credible, especially when the
quality in question can be verified cheaply after the fact."°
Thus, legal rules can provide sellers with incentives to make full
disclosures.11
Much as warranty contracts can convey information to consumers, OEMs can reveal information about aftermarket costs to
consumers via aftermarket supply contracts. Professors Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner have argued that contract default rules
should be chosen so as to "penalize" the more informed party,
thus inducing that party to reveal its information in contract
bargaining and formation."' This theory, as applied to the
problem of aftermarket costs, resembles a penalty default for
OEMs: firms can avoid the penalty by revealing the types of
information that concerned the Kodak Court, such as life-cycle
price information, in aftermarket supply contracts."m An exemption from antitrust liability under Kodak for OEMs that offer
aftermarket supply contracts creates incentives for disclosure of

108Theorists argue that warranty terms provide information to consumers about
mechanical reliability of the product. Akerlof, 84 Q J Econ at 499 (cited in note 13);
Spence, Market Signaling at 88-90 (cited in note 13). See also Bryant and Gerner, 12 J
Consumer Aff at 32, 45-46 (cited in note 13); Gerner and Bryant, 15 J Consumer Aff at
77-86 (cited in note 13) (finding empirical evidence of substantial uniformity in warranty
terms, such as duration of coverage, that enable cross-brand comparison). Writers have
also argued that the cost of a warranty, emphasized by its price and any exclusions,
provides an extremely important signal for consumers, since more reliable products cost
less for the manufacturer to guarantee. See Spence, Market Signalling at 88-90; Note, 88
Colum L Rev at 1061-62 (cited in note 12).
M See Sanford J. Grossman, The InformationalRole of Warranties and PrivateDisclosure About Product Quality, 24 J L & Econ 461, 462-63 (1981).
...Id. Conversely, if consumers cannot enforce rights against producers for misrepresentations, then consumers will remain uninformed, since they will not be able to rely on
producers' representations. Id. Consumers need credible information on risks in order to
make efficient purchases. See Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,Product Failure
and ProducerLiability, 44 Rev Econ Stud 561, 562-64 (1977). One writer has argued that
warranties successfully convey the necessary information to buyers via the price mechanism, if such warranties are priced separately from the purchased equipment. See Note,
88 Colum L Rev at 1062-63 (cited in note 12).
.. Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 91 (cited in note 105).
,' Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2085, 2085-86 n 20.
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information that helps both consumers and courts.'13 By fostering efficient disclosures, this rule meets Kodak's concerns about
unsophisticated consumers and mirrors the logic behind consumer products warranties and contract default rules.
B. The Mechanics of the Proposal
1. The price mechanism will convey information to consumers.
The price of aftermarket supply contracts would reflect the
life-cycle pricing data that concerned the Kodak Court.! 4 To
fairly price these contracts, OEMs would have to calculate the
aftermarket costs of the equipment,"' including estimates of
future product maintenance and repair."6 Although the price of
such a contract would not include costs specific to the individual
consumer, the contract price would likely provide information
that consumers could weigh in addition to what they know themselves. Furthermore, if OEMs offered lifetime aftermarket supply
contracts priced separately from durable equipment itself, then
consumers could make better-informed decisions about which
product to buy and whether or not to purchase the aftermarket
goods or services in advance." 7 Consumers could gather the information necessary to make informed decisions by comparing
the prices and durations of the contracts. Consumers could infer
from the prices of these contracts, for example, that a copy machine with a cheaper aftermarket supply contract will be cheaper
to operate and maintain."' Based on the price of the contract,
consumers could also decide, given their own individual circumstances, whether or not they could maintain and operate the
equipment more cheaply on their own."
.. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 124 (cited in note 105) (advocating the use
of legal formalities and penalty defaults to elicit information in contracts, thereby lowering courts' subsequent decision making costs).
"' Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2085, 2085-86 n 20.
.. Producers of durable equipment currently calculate some risks and costs of their
products after initial sale, such as the cost of injuries to consumers due to product defects.
See, for example, Reynold M. Sachs, Products Liability: An Economic View, Trial 48, 50
(Mar 1978).
See Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1062-63 (cited in note 12).
"7 The logic behind this Section is similar to one commentator's products liability proposal regarding imperfect warranty information. See id at 1063-68.
See Spence, Market Signaling at 88-90 (cited in note 13).
"s
"9
Consumers will choose to "self-insure" in this manner for two reasons: (1) if a producer cannot distinguish high- and low-risk consumers, the cost of coverage for any given
risk will represent the average cost for all consumers. Thus if an individual's expected
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OEMs would find it difficult to deceive consumers by underor overpricing these contracts because these contracts are largely
self-regulating. Market forces and existing law constrain OEMs'
ability to set prices above or below market rates. For example, an
OEM might try to underprice such a contract to make consumers
think that its products break down less frequently or require less
service to use." ° But if an OEM underprices such a contract,
consumers will buy more contracts than if they were priced accurately.2' As a result, OEMs will have to provide more aftermarket goods and services at prices lower than the accurate
price, while receiving less money per contract. 2
Similarly, an OEM might raise the price of contracts for
aftermarket goods and services to either gouge consumers or
deter them from buying these contracts. But in response, consumers could infer that the higher prices reflect the shoddy quality of the original equipment, leading to fewer total sales.'2
Market forces limit both under- and overpricing of these contracts.
Of course, market constraints might not completely balance
out the incentive to under- or overprice. But a manufacturer who
underprices contracts to supply aftermarket goods may be liable
for predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman Act or under
state unfair competition laws.' Moreover, manufacturers who
costs are below average for the risks covered, it will be cheaper for that individual not to
purchase coverage; and (2) it may be generally cheaper for consumers of a given product
to avert the harm caused by the risk themselves rather than contract for coverage. See
Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1063 n 29 (cited in note 12), citing Priest, 90 Yale L J at 1307-19
(cited in note 12).
' See Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1066 (cited in note 12).
2 The law of supply and demand specifies that, given a downward-sloping demand
curve (usual in both the real world and the world of perfect competition), when price
drops consumers will buy more of a given product. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy § 1.1 at 4-5 (cited in note 1). See also Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1066 (cited in note
12).
Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 1.1 at 4-5 (cited in note 1).
See Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 12). See also Alan Schwartz and
Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va L Rev 1387, 1396 (1983) (Consumers use a
warranty's price and the extent of its coverage to gauge the quality of a firm's products.).
1"4 See Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1066 n 36 (cited in note 12). Section 2 of the Sherman
Act prohibits "predatory pricing"-selling goods or services below cost. See 15 USC § 2
(1988 & Supp 1990). See also Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingand
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697, 697 (1975). In
addition, an OEM selling an aftermarket supply contract below cost may also be liable
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deliberately overprice their aftermarket goods and services contracts to exploit customers later would still be subject to Kodak
to the extent that such purchases were not made by "sophisticat-

ed" buyers.'
3. Potential problems can be resolved.
Potential pitfalls to aftermarket supply contracts can be
avoided. First, some might question whether OEMs could offer
contracts to supply aftermarket goods and services where the
prices and quantities required might be unknowable. While this
is a realistic concern, the manufacturer certainly possesses more
relevant knowledge about the product than the consumer prior to
purchase. Certainly, manufacturers can and do estimate some
unknown costs. 6
Consumers who estimate their future aftermarket costs to be
higher than average may be more likely to buy aftermarket supply contracts, but this should be a minor problem. This phenomenon, termed "adverse selection," has usually been associated with
insurance; when a seller of insurance cannot distinguish between
more and less risky purchasers, those who pose the worst risks
will buy insurance disproportionately (consequently distorting its
price and deterring others from purchasing it)."' Opponents of
this rule might argue that, as with insurance contracts, consumers who think they are more likely to need aftermarket goods or
services will be more likely to purchase aftermarket supply contracts, distorting the price of aftermarket supply contracts just as
in the insurance context.'
But adverse selection does not present overwhelming difficulties for two reasons. First, like insurance contracts, to the extent

under state unfair competition laws. See Rudolf Callmann, IA The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 7.53 at 181-85 (Callaghan, 4th ed 1981 & Supp
1994).
See Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2086-88.
1
126 Note that manufacturers already estimate such unknowable risks as product
accident costs. See Sachs, Trial at 50 (cited in note 115). Some commentators justify strict
liability rules in products liability on the ground that manufacturers can estimate such
risks better than consumers. See Sigmund A. Horvitz and Louis H. Stern, Liability Rules
and the Selection of a Socially OptimalProduction Technology, 7 Intl Rev L & Econ 121,
125-26 (1987). See also David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation,
74 Mich L Rev 1257, 1258 (1976) (noting that manufacturers have "virtually exclusive access" to information on some product risks).
Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1067 (cited in note 12), citing Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 293 (Norton, 2d ed 1984).
'2

Id.
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that adverse selection is due to some misuse or overuse of the
equipment, 2 9 the contract can specify such reasons as grounds
for cancellation or curtailment of the contract.13 Second, unlike
the insurance scenario, consumers' knowledge about themselves
may be relatively unimportant compared to OEMs' knowledge
about their equipment; because consumers weigh information the
manufacturer conveys together with what they know about themselves, if the former is much larger than the latter, the effects of
individualized information will be relatively small.'3 '
United States antitrust laws would not prohibit these contracts. 3 2 By merely offering these contracts, OEMs do not condition sale of the original equipment on sale of the coritract to
supply aftermarket goods and services, or vice versa."' More
importantly, two circuit courts," as well as Justice Scalia's dissent in Kodak,"' indicate that the contracts in question are legal under antitrust law.
Finally, opponents of these contracts may argue that the
contracts address antitrust problems by creating contract problems. However, courts are generally better at solving contract
problems.'3 6 As Allen-Myland demonstrates, Kodak leaves lower
courts making impressionistic decisions about how to handle
3 7 Regardless of
market imperfections due to information costs."

' This type of bias is more properly called "moral hazard": the phenomenon in which
the purchase of insurance encourages its purchaser to take risks he or she would otherwise avoid. See Priest, 90 Yale L J at 1313-14 (cited in note 12).
'30 See id at 1314 (noting that producers and consumers can and do contract around

the problem of moral hazard), citing Isaac Ehrlich and Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance,
Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J Pol Econ 623, 641-43 (1972).
11 See Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 1063 n 29 (cited in note 12).
1 The Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1 (1988 & Supp 1990), prohibits some tying arrangements. See note 47.
'"' One of the requirements to find an illegal tie between two products (such as
original equipment and its supply contract) is that "the scheme in question involves two
distinct items and provides that one (the tying product) may not be obtained unless the
other (the tied product) is also purchased." Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 10.1 at
351 n 3 (cited in note 1), quoting Siegel v Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F2d 43, 47 (9th Cir
1971).
"3 With respect to antitrust tying law, lower courts have favorably received similar
aftermarket contracts. Service & Training,Inc. v Data GeneralCorp, 963 F2d 680, 687-88
(4th Cir 1992) (decided just before Kodak); Amerinet, Inc. v Xerox Corp, 972 F2d 1483,
1499-1500 (8th Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1048 (1993) (decided just after Kodak).
1
112 S Ct at 2095 (Scalia dissenting).
See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 Colurn L Rev 799,
801-02 (1941) (stressing that the forms required by contract law force parties to "channel"
their intentions in a manner that courts can handle).
" Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 206 n 15 (suggesting that, depending on how easy it was
for consumers to switch from mainframes to smaller capacity computers, the District
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the effect on courts, however, this rule creates much clearer
guidelines for OEMs. The following Section more fully describes
the benefits of the proposed rule.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE RULE
A. Exempting OEMs That Help Reduce the Effect of Information
Gaps Conserves Social Resources
A rule that exempts OEMs from aftermarket liability when
they offer fairly priced contracts to supply aftermarket goods and
services for the reasonable lifetime of durable equipment conserves social resources. Such a rule makes life simpler for OEMs.
Additionally, this rule enables courts to address a central concern
of Kodak, the "commercial realities" faced by consumers, 3 '
while conserving judicial resources.
1. The rule conserves private resources by giving OEMs
guidance.
With this rule courts define clear legal boundaries for OEMs
in aftermarket sales. The Supreme Court and previous commentators have emphasized the value businesses place on increased
certainty in antitrust law.'3 9 The rule would provide OEMs with
a for compliance: offer lifetime aftermarket goods and services at
a fair price, and you need not worry about Kodak-type liability.
By contrast, the Allen-Myland approach forces businesses to
assess how easy or difficult it is for their customers to shift to
other products."4 With that estimate of interchangeability,
businesses would have to revise their estimated market
shares." Even once they had determined their revised market
shares, they would still have to predict how high a share would
render them liable under the antitrust laws.'
Court should reduce IBM's market share in mainframes "by a number greater than zero
percent but less than the full extent of the market").
,' Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2085-87.
"'
See United States v Topco Associates, Inc., 405 US 596, 607 (1972), quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958) (noting that the principle of
per se unreasonableness "makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned"); Robert Pitofsky, In
Defense ofDiscounters:The No-Frills Case for a PerSe Rule Against Vertical PriceFixing,
71 Georgetown L J 1487, 1489 (1983) ("[T]here is a virtue in telling businessmen accurately and precisely the location of legal limits on business conduct.").
140 See Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 206 n 15. See also text accompanying note 87.
'
See Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 206 n 15.
142 Tying law seems to require a 30 percent share of a properly defined market in
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Furthermore, the proposed rule would address concerns that
"innocent" firms in markets with information imperfections could
fall victim to consumers taking advantage of Kodak."4 Under
Kodak, plaintiffs could possibly make claims against OEMs that
neither created nor intentionally exploited information costs in
their aftermarkets. Under the rule advocated here, innocent
firms could avoid liability simply by disclosing the required information in the contract prices of lifetime parts, service, and supplies. Thus the rule can help avert legal outcomes that at least
one commentator has argued would not be "fair."' 4
2. The rule conserves judicial resources.
After Kodak was decided, commentators predicted that it
would raise the level of proof necessary to obtain summary judgment.' As a result, Kodak generated fears of a great increase
in the judicial workload.' Additionally, at least one writer has
noted the difficulties that issues in Kodak may present for juries.'4 7
A rule that exempts OEMs that convey useful information by
offering contracts for lifetime aftermarket goods and services
should make it easier for courts to grant summary judgment.'
In cases where aftermarket supply contracts were offered, courts
would simply inquire whether the prices on such contracts were
fair at the time they were offered. But because OEMs will pos-

order to prove market power. Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.7 at 120 (cited in

note 1). But note that under Allen-Myland, firms would still have to assess the
interchangeability of their products on a scale of 0 to 100 percent, then weigh the relative
sizes of the product markets that may be interchangeable. See Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at
206 n 15. A small error in estimating from 0 to 100 percent could easily push a firm above

or below the 30 percent figure. For an example of the math involved, see note 79.
" See Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 371 (cited in note 5) (worrying that Kodak broadly
interpreted could imperil "small firms that have neither generated nor abused the imperfections in their market[s]").
14 Id at 371-72.
'

See Judy L. Whalley, Robin P. Rosen, and Carole Handler, Exclusive Dealing,Full-

Line Forcing and Tying Arrangements, in 33rd Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar:
Distribution, Marketing, and Joint Ventures 235, 319 (PLI, 1993) ("What seems
clear... is that Kodak will further complicate any attempt to expedite an antitrust
lawsuit.").
1"' See Comment, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline
and Fall of the Chicago Empire?, 68 Notre Dame L Rev 619, 662 (1993); Schwarzer and
Hirsch, 45 Hastings L J at 15 (cited in note 10). See also note 10 concerning the resources
that some antitrust cases have already consumed.
147 Jacobs, 79 Minn L Rev at 32 n 135 (cited in note 10).
" Contract law should channel parties' intentions and disputes into expressions that
courts are better at handling. See Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 801-02 (cited in note 136).
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sess incentives to make accurate disclosures, courts should have
to make this inquiry infrequently.
Nevertheless, to assess the proposed rule, decision makers

should not simply consider how difficult it is for courts to decide
if a price is fair. Rather, this difficulty should be compared directly to the difficulty of investigating the market imperfections cited
in Kodak. 50 In making this comparison, decision makers must
weigh courts' experience in determining fair prices and appropriate disclosures in other contexts. 5 ' Specifically, rule makers
should consider courts' substantial experience in interpreting and
enforcing contract terms in other contexts.
In sum, this rule creates incentives for OEMs to disclose
information at the time of original equipment purchase, resulting
in a smaller total number of disputes over aftermarket monopolies. 5"' 2 Moreover, this rule creates incentives for OEMs as private actors to convey information ex ante, leaving courts to decide ex post whether this information was useful. Thus, the rule
in question should conserve judicial resources, since through contract formation it will channel away53 many disputes and make
summary judgment easier to obtain.
B. The Proposed Rule Addresses the Two Main Information
Problems in Aftermarket Monopolies
Under the proposed rule, as opposed to other proposed limits
on Kodak,TM judges would consider the information problems

' See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 124 (cited in note 105) (Legal formalities
that force revelation of information to prospective disputants and possible future courts
lower the costs of subsequent decision making.), citing Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 801-02
(cited in note 136).
" See Allen-Myland, 33 F3d at 206 n 15.
...See Priest, 90 Yale L J at 1297 (cited in note 12) (on the familiarity of warranty
contracts). Compare Fuller, 41 Colum L Rev at 801-02 (cited in note 136) (on the usefulness of contract formalities for courts), with Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 3.5 at
105 (cited in note 1) (on the difficulty that judges have in dealing with issues such as the
substitutability of different products and suppliers in antitrust law).
1"2 See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 91 (cited in note 105) (Legal rules should be
chosen in such a way as to give at least one party the incentive to create a contract; legal
rules that encourage bargaining can "encourage the parties to reveal information to each
other or to third parties (especially the courts).").
"5 Id at 99 ("[S]ocial welfare may be enhanced by forcing parties to reveal information
to a subsidized judicial system. .. ").
" At least one writer has advocated overturning Kodak. See Arthur, 69 NYU L Rev
at 76 (cited in note 103). See also Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 368-73 (cited in note 5) (advocating three restrictions on Kodak: limiting it to its facts; developing a method to measure
information gaps and then screening out cases where such gaps are small; and adding a
tort-like causation requirement).
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that distort aftermarket prices. There are at least two such information problems. First, OEMs may strategically withhold information in order to create market imperfections that they can exploit.' The OEM possesses more information, and depending
on the details of the market in which it competes, it may be costly or even impossible for a consumer to otherwise acquire good
information. 5 ' Additionally, even without any bad intent by
OEMs, consumers may be unable to afford the time
and effort
5 7
required to cope with the information they receive.
The first problem, strategic withholding of information, has
attracted the attention of legal scholars. 5 ' Professors Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner have proposed that some contractual incompleteness may stem from one party strategically withholding
information, decreasing the total gains from contracting in order
to increase his or her share of those gains.'59 The rule advocated here would induce OEMs to provide information, avoiding "incomplete" information about the future cost of aftermarket goods.
The rule would reduce courts' administrative costs just as better
written, more complete contracts do, as well as reducing
businesses' legal costs and consumers' information costs.
Additionally, commentators have confronted the second problem, consumers' inability to process the information they receive. 6 ° Consumers need information in forms that they can

" See Jacobs, 52 Md L Rev at 371-73 (cited in note 5) (distinguishing OEMs that
neither generated nor abused market imperfections from those that did).
'
See Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2086. See also Stephen Salop, The Noisy Monopolist:
Imperfect Information, PriceDispersion and Price Discrimination,44 Rev Econ Stud 393,
393 (1977) (arguing that sellers exploit differences in levels of consumer information to
maximize gain from poorly informed consumers).
...See, for example, Herbert A. Simon, FromSubstantive to ProceduralRationality,in
2 Models of Bounded Rationality 424, 430 (MIT, 1982) (noting that while economics
traditionally has assumed actors to be infinitely capable of rational calculation in order to
optimize their behavior, in the real world we must consider the limits on human mental
abilities to gather and process information).
'" See, for example, Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 99-100, 127 (cited in note 105);
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of ContractDefault
Rules, 100 Yale L J 615, 625-28 (1990); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729, 735-44 (1992).
'5 Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 99-100, 127 (cited in note 105).
'
See, for example, Oskar Morgenstern, Thirteen CriticalPoints in ContemporaryEconomic Theory: An Interpretation,10 J Econ Lit 1163, 1175 (1972) (Given the conditions of
perfect competition, "[o]ptimal allocation is a conceptually simple matter for the consumer ...[however] [tihis may be computationally of phenomenal difficulty....."). See also
Howard Rachlin, John H. Kagel, and Raymond C. Battalio, Substitutability in Time
Allocation, 87 Psychological Rev 355, 359 n 1 (1980) ("Economics is often said to be a
science of rational behavior, but 'rationality' means no more to economists than conformity to economic theory. Economics is properly a science of maximization rather than
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handle. The rule in question would encourage OEMs to gather
complex and wide-ranging information and to translate that
information into the concrete terms and prices of supply contracts. Consumers can process information in the form of these
contracts just as they can handle product warranties.
Disparities in information can cause problems in aftermarket
product pricing not anticipated in classical economic theory.
Adopting a legal rule that induces information sharing can correct market imperfections ex ante by educating "unsophisticated"
consumers. Such a rule would set a clear legal standard for
businesses to follow, promote summary judgment, and simplify
adjudication of cases that go to trial.
CONCLUSION

As discussed above, there are several virtues in a rule that
exempts from aftermarket liability those OEMs that convey information through contracts to provide aftermarket goods. This rule
would provide OEMs guidance and conserve judicial resources
while addressing the Court's recent concerns about imperfect
information. But beyond these benefits, this rule continues a
trend away from caveat emptor and toward requiring sellers to
disclose information about various risks and costs that their
customers may bear.'6 1 Information is no longer "slum dwelling"
in Stigler's "town of economics,"" 2 but has taken up residence
in the law's central business district.

rationality.").
161 See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Stephen C. Salop, The Efficient Regula-

tion of Consumer Information, 24 J L & Econ 491, 492 (1981) (discussing the disclosures
necessary for the exercise of "informed consent" to medical operations); id at 656-57
(discussing sellers' duties to warn buyers of potentially dangerous products); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 USC §§ 1451-61 (1988 & Supp 1992) ("[llnformed consumers are
essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free market economy.").
16 See George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J Pol Econ 213, 213 (1961).

